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Medicalization is typically defined as a societal process where more and more aspects of 
everyday life come under medical dominion, influence and supervision. The process of 
medicalization is part of a larger historical transition involving social values associated with 
traditional institutions, such as the church, the common law and the family, being replaced 
by the values of science and the scientific method. The practice of medicine has been an 
important player in this transition. The observation that medicine had “nudged aside” or 
“replaced” religion as the dominant moral force in the social control of modern societies is a 
central theme in medicalization research surveyed in the influential review by Conrad 
(1992). However, the lack of cohesion in this research is reflected in the considerable effort 
Conrad and others dedicate to the search for a precise definition of ‘medicalization’. Writing 
over a decade later, a continuing lack of cohesion in the state of medicalization research is 
reflected by Sismondi (2004):  “For the most part, medicalization is discussed in terms of the 
politics of professions, with medical professions gaining importance as they take control 
over the problems . The means by which economic interests shape medical knowledge and 
medical discourse have not been well explored”  
Recognizing the remarkable technological and economic evolution of the medical profession 
in the last two decades, Poitras and Meredith (2009), Conrad (2007, 2005) and Conrad and 
Leiter (2004) find that medicalization is too diverse a concept to be analysed with a unifying 
methodology. Building on these insights, this chapter explores the analytical advantages of 
dichotomizing the concept of medicalization into two distinct components: economic 
medicalization, where the corporate profit motive plays a central role; and, social 
medicalization, where traditional concerns of social control predominate. Poitras and 
Meredith (2009) and Poitras (2009) demonstrate that economic medicalization involves a 
sharp ethical divergence between the goal of shareholder wealth maximization, associated 
with business ethics, and the norms of science and the scientific method, associated with 
medical ethics. In turn, the array of substantive global risks associated with the progress of 
certain elements of modern medical technology makes exploration of the implications of 
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economic medicalization a useful exercise. In this chapter, section 2 details the development 
of the concept of medicalization, from the early contributions by Szasz and Wootton in the 
1950's and continuing to Conrad (2007) and Moloney et al. (2011). Section 3 discusses 
general differences between: medical ethics, as detailed by the American Medical 
Association (AMA); and, business ethics, as reflected in the objective of corporate 
shareholder wealth maximization, e.g., Poitras (1994). Sections 4 and 5 examine two key 
practical outcomes of economic medicalization: direct-to-consumer marketing of 
pharmaceuticals; and, medical research that produces ethically questionable outcomes. 
Finally, the paper concludes with section 6 that considers currently observable trends in 
economic medicalization. 
2. The concept of medicalization
1
 
The modern concept of medicalization emerged during the 1950's when Thomas Szasz (born 
1920), Barbara Wootton (1897-1988) and others attacked the advance of psychiatry beyond 
the treatment of well defined mental disorders into areas of dysfunctional behaviour related 
to crime and delinquency (Wootton 1959; Szasz 1958, 1958a, 1961). These seminal 
contributions built on Parsons (1951) where the identification of medicine as an institution 
of social control was initially proposed. Following Szasz and Wootton, ‘science’ was and is 
replacing traditional areas of social morality as the means of distinguishing the “undeniably 
mad” from those “who are simply unable to manage their lives” (Davis 2006, p.51). Yet, the 
distinction between ‘mentally incompetent’ and ‘sinful’ needs to be determined by social 
values. Allowing ‘medical science’ to encroach on this decision shifts attention to the 
individual rather than the environment as the source of the problem. Wootton observes: 
“Always it is easier to put up a clinic than to pull down a slum.” While insightful, the early 
contributions by Szasz and Wootton only examined the narrow confines of psychiatry 
where the social implications of medicalization were readily discernible. The extension of 
these initial notions to a wider field of applications was proposed by Freidson and Zola 
during the 1970's where the connection between medicalization and social control was more 
firmly established (Freidson 1970; Zola 1972). 
In traditional sociology where social control is a central concept, the connection between 
social control and medicalization is appealing. The observation that medicine had “nudged 
aside” or “replaced” religion as the dominant moral force in the social control of modern 
societies was a central theme in medicalization research surveyed in the influential review 
by Conrad (1992). However, the lack of cohesion in this research is reflected in the 
considerable effort Conrad (1992) dedicates to the search for a precise definition of 
‘medicalization’.2 Driven by the remarkable evolution of the medical profession in the last 
                                                                          
1 The following discussion updates and extends Poitras (2009). 
2 Writing over a decade later, this lack of cohesion in the state of medicalization research is reflected by 
Sismondi: “For the most part, medicalization is discussed in terms of the politics of professions, with 
medical professions gaining importance as they take control over the problems, and sometimes the lives 
and movements, of a typically disempowered group. Somewhat less frequently, medicalization is 
discussed in terms of the economics of healthcare industries, including associations of doctors, 
insurance companies, and drug companies; a few cases include analyses of depression, hyperactivity, 
osteoporosis, and sexology. The means by which economic interests shape medical knowledge and 
medical discourse have not been well explored.” 
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two decades, it is becoming gradually apparent that the medicalization concept is too 
diverse to be analysed with a unifying methodology (Conrad 2007; Conrad and Leiter 2004; 
Poitras and Meredith 2009). In particular, considerable insight is gained if medicalization is 
dichotomized into two categories: social medicalization, dealing with the type of social control 
issues that originate with Parsons, Szasz and Wootton; and, economic medicalization, dealing 
with the markets for medical technology and professional services driven by the corporate 
profit motive. 
Defining medicalization as a process where more and more aspects of everyday life come 
under medical dominion, influence and supervision ultimately requires “the turning of non-
medical problems into medical ones” (Sismondi 2004, p.153). Medicalization can occur for 
various reasons. Drawing a distinction between economic and social medicalization focuses 
attention on the ethical motives of the medical professionals involved in the process. Social 
medicalization is concerned with encroachment of the medical profession into areas 
traditionally controlled by other professions, such as the legal profession for deviant 
behaviour or the ecclesiastic profession for reproductive decisions. This often leads to a 
sociological examination of issues surrounding the competition of the professions for social 
control. While the profit motive may play some role, the complexity of issues surrounding 
the ethics of the market place are not a central concern. In contrast, economic medicalization 
encompasses cases where the profit motive plays a substantive role in the transformation of 
non-medical problems into medical ones. In particular, Healy (2004) identifies economic 
medicalization with the “marketing of disease”. 
Numerous instances of economic medicalization have been identified. For example, Conrad 
and Leiter (2004) examine the direct-to-consumer marketing campaigns by pharmaceutical 
companies and the development of private medical markets. Conrad (2007) finds evidence 
of economic medicalization in numerous cases such as: male disorders associated with aging 
including andropause, baldness and erectile dysfunction; behavioral disorders such as 
ADHD in adults and hyperactivity in children; and certain applications of biomedical 
enhancement drugs such as steroids and human growth hormone. Moloney et al. (2010) 
examine the economic medicalization of sleeplessness. Avorn (2006) details the deceptions 
pharmaceutical companies have used to hide the evidence of adverse drug effects. Jones and 
Hagtvelt (2008) consider the tragic implications of treatments for malaria. Instead of seeking 
the cost-effective solution of eradication by treatment of the local populations, available 
treatments are targeted at the more profitable Western visitors and ex-patriots sojourning in 
those regions. In contrast, social medicalization includes studies where the profit motive 
plays a lesser role, such as studies of spouse battering or gender deviance. The classification 
of some areas of medicalization research depend on the methodological approach taken, 
such as studies of childbirth, long term disability, infertility and abortion, where the profit 
motive may or may not be of central concern. 
Since the public policy disasters created by drugs such as elixir sulfanilamide in 1937 and 
thalidomide in the early 1960's, it has been recognized that medical research and 
development (R&D) is an area where the conflict of interest between private sector firms 
guided by the profit motive and those of government acting in the ‘public interest’ needs to 
be managed through regulatory oversight. The raison d’etre of the institutional review board 
(IRB) is to ensure that ethical norms of the general population are not put at risk by the 
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private sector firms conducting the bulk of medical R&D that are motivated by the ethical 
standards of the marketplace. The corporate profit motive provides strong incentives: to 
recoup R&D expenditures as soon as possible; to recoup acquisition costs related to the 
takeover of other firms that have developed potentially marketable technologies for drugs 
or devices;  to exploit first mover advantages where the danger of a ‘race to market’ with 
potentially competing innovative drugs or devices may be apparent; to develop alternative 
(off-label) applications and delivery mechanisms for existing drugs; and, to extend drug or 
device patent protection by reformulations combining these drugs with other existing 
medications. Faced with a limited time to patent expiration, there is great economic pressure 
on pharmaceutical companies to move drugs to market as quickly as possible. Rewards are 
more closely tied to the number of prescriptions written for a drug than to the incremental 
medical value of the treatment. 
The regulatory infrastructure for conducting research through clinical trials is juxtaposed 
against the corporate requirement of profitability through successful marketing of 
pharmaceuticals or medical devices. In a world of declining opportunities for highly 
profitable ‘new’ patent-able drug discoveries, the stage is set for serious ethical conflict to 
emerge between the players. This conflict is central to analysis of economic medicalization 
where the ethical norms of ‘science’ are confronted with the ethics of the market place, e.g., 
Angell (2004). In science, accuracy of measurement and validity through replication are 
fundamental elements. In contrast, the objective of profitability is supported by research, 
biased or unbiased, that recommends prescription of the treatment on offer. Examples of 
such bias are accumulating. For example, Heres et al. (2006) examines 33 company 
sponsored studies of second generation anti-psychotic drugs and finds that in ‘head to head’ 
studies involving competing products, the reported total outcome was in favour of the 
sponsor’s drug 90% of the time  (Heres et al. 2006, Bhandari et al., 2004). Such an ‘empirical’ 
result seems outside the bounds of scientific credibility. 
3. Medical ethics and business ethics 
Practical examples of the medical profession extending authority over matters not directly 
concerned with the analysis and treatment of biophysical disorders are readily available. 
Ethical analysis of such developments is complicated because the ‘medical profession’ 
includes not only practising doctors and associations of doctors but also: the pharmaceutical 
and medical device industry, providing the drugs and medical technologies that are an 
essential component of modern medicine; the academic institutions and journals involved in 
training doctors and sponsoring essential research activities; the medical insurance industry 
that processes payments for the bulk of medical services; and, the government granting 
agencies and other sponsors that supply essential funding to the research conducted by the 
medical profession. In addition, governments also play differing roles as medical insurer 
and provider of medical services, e.g., in Canada the monopoly provider of health services is 
the federal and provincial governments. Significantly, because the source of capital for the 
corporations producing pharmaceutical and medical devices is the global financial markets, 
the primary motivation of these important players in the medical profession differs from 
those of the other players. The implications of this difference are reflected in the legion of 
studies on the marketing networks of the pharmaceutical companies and the sophisticated 
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efforts involved in selling products. The differing motivations within the medical profession 
create a range of potential ethical quandaries. 
Due to the diverse and competing ethical norms that impact the medical profession, it is not 
easy to discern the de facto objectives driving particular actions and outcomes. As Poitras 
and Meredith (2009) observe: “There is an ethical transparency problem”. The difficulty of 
discerning the ethical motivations of specific players within the medical profession can even 
occur for physicians where the ethics of professional fiduciary responsibility would seem to 
be clear cut, based on ethical standards stretching back to the Oath of Hippocrates which 
first appeared around the fifth century B.C., e.g., AMA (2010, p.ix). The Oath protects the 
rights of the patient by appealing to the strong character of the physician, no formal 
sanctions or penalties are contemplated. The Oath was “Christianized” around the eleventh 
century A.D. and remains an essential component of the ideal ethical conduct of physicians 
up to the present. The evolution of medical practice gradually surpassed the ethical 
guidance provided by the Oath. Building on contributions from the Scottish physician John 
Gregory (1724-1773), in 1803 the English physician Thomas Percival (1740-1804) published a 
‘Code of Medical Ethics’ to address the need for more detailed ethical guidance. The 
Percival code was, more-or-less, adopted by the AMA in 1847 (McCollough 1988). Since that 
time, a number of major revisions to the Code have been made, with four such revisions 
during the twentieth century (1903, 1912, 1947, and 1994).3 
In addition to specifying nine principles of medical ethics, the AMA provides detailed 
opinions on ethical behaviour for specific situations, e.g., conflicts of interest in biomedical 
research (AMA 2010).4  Ethical opinions for over 200 situational problems are currently 
provided. Opinions cover a wide range of subjects, from the controversial to the mundane. 
In the realm of social policy, controversial issues such as cloning, euthanasia and gene 
therapy are examined. More mundane opinions cover inter-professional and hospital 
relationships and patient confidentiality. Though the present code and related opinions 
have evolved considerably from the early beginnings of the Oath and the Percival code, 
basic principles still remain: physicians should base clinical practice and research on the best 
                                                                          
3 The nine principles of the AMA code are (AMA 2010, p.xv): “I. A physician shall be dedicated to 
providing competent medical care, with compassion and respect for human dignity and rights. II. A 
physician shall uphold the standards of professionalism, be honest in all professional interactions, and 
strive to report physicians deficient in character or competence, or engaging in fraud or deception, to 
appropriate entities. III. A physician shall respect the law and also recognize a responsibility to seek 
changes in those requirements which are contrary to the best interests of the patient. IV. A physician 
shall respect the rights of patients, colleagues, and other health professionals, and shall safeguard 
patient confidences and privacy within the constraints of the law. V. A physician shall continue to 
study, apply, and advance scientific knowledge, maintain a commitment to medical education, make 
relevant information available to patients, colleagues, and the public, obtain consultation, and use the 
talents of other health professionals when indicated. VI. A physician shall, in the provision of 
appropriate patient care, except in emergencies, be free to choose whom to serve, with whom to 
associate, and the environment in which to provide medical care. VII. A physician shall recognize a 
responsibility to participate in activities contributing to the improvement of the community and the 
betterment of public health. VIII. A physician shall, while caring for a patient, regard responsibility to 
the patient as paramount. IX. A physician shall support access to medical care for all people.” 
4 Similar ethical codes and procedures have been established by the medical associations in other 
countries, e.g., the code of ethics of the Canadian Medical Association is similar to that of the AMA. 
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science available; individual self-interest is secondary to the well being of the patient; and, 
medical knowledge is a public trust to be used to the benefit of patients and society. 
Significantly, “Principles adopted by the American Medical Association are not laws, but 
standards of conduct which define the essentials of honorable behavior for the physician” 
(AMA 2010, p.xvi). 
For physicians and other medical professionals engaged in medical research, there are 
related ethical standards that also apply. Following Weijer et al. (1997): “Medical research 
involving human subjects raises complex ethical, legal and social issues. Investigators 
sometimes find that their obligations with respect to a research project come into conflict 
with their obligations to individual patients.”  In addition to the AMA code and related 
opinions, ethical standards for medical research have been set out by a variety of 
government deparments, agencies and commissions such as the National Commission for 
the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research (NCPHS), US 
Department of Health and Human Services and, in Canada, the Tri-Council of research 
funding agencies. Medical professionals may also be members of non-governmental 
organizations that issue statements of ethical standards such as the Council for International 
Organizations of Medical Sciences and the Human Genome Organization. Recognizing 
there is some variation in the specific ethical statements, the range of standards proposed for 
medical research can be roughly and briefly summarized as: obtain informed consent; 
protect the privacy of patient medical information; and, do no harm. 
The long established field of traditional medical ethics is patient centered. While the AMA 
aims to provide guidance to physicians for dealing with the increasingly complex ethical 
issues raised by the relentless progress of modern biotechnology, the AMA ‘Code of 
Medical Ethics’ is not able to provide sufficient guidance to deal with the multitude of  inter-
disciplinary ethical problems raised by research into areas such as: cloning; stem cells; 
genetic modification of foods; euthanasia; DNA data banking; genetic manipulation of 
human DNA; and, testing for genetic markers. The issues involved are so varied and 
significant that the field of bioethics has emerged to address such issues, e.g., Eaton (2004). 
Biotechnology has also impacted research areas that have long-standing social and religious 
significance such as abortion and the determination of death. While medical ethics has 
considerable interest in such issues, bioethics goes beyond medical ethics to incorporate 
knowledge from moral philosophy, law, sociology, molecular biology, economics and other 
subjects. Central to the issues confronting bioethics is the justification for introducing new 
technologies. In practice, this ethical problem is confounded by the commercial aspects 
involved in developing these technologies. The substantial capital investments required for 
biotechnology advances dictate that bioethics also address the implications of corporate 
decision making. 
Because some of the largest multinational corporations in the world are directly involved in 
the market for medical products and services, bioethics needs to incorporate elements of 
business ethics in order to accurately assess a range of important issues. In business ethics it 
is necessary to recognize that corporations pursue strategies consistent with shareholder 
wealth maximization (SWM). Following Poitras (1994), the goal of SWM depends on the 
future common stock price and, as such, does not have ethical transparency. Some 
assumption about the efficiency of the stock market in valuing ethical concerns is required. 
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In this vein, the layers of regulatory oversight aimed to restrict unfettered corporate activity 
come into play. In the key area of medical research, this oversight includes the ethical 
approval process for medical research in the US embodied in Title 45 Code of Federal 
Regulation (CFR) Part 46 that empowers the IRB.5  Similar bodies are empowered in other 
countries, such as Research Ethics Board (REB) in Canada, e.g., Meredith and Poitras (2008). 
Also important in the US is Title 21 CFR, Part 56 that requires IRB’s to oversee clinical trials 
of drugs involved in new drug applications to the FDA. Ultimately, it is difficult to expect 
much more than an ‘ethical-is-legal’ approach to corporate decisions regarding medical 
research and development if SWM is the goal. Significantly higher ethical standards may 
come at a financial cost that impacts corporate profitability undermining achievement of 
SWM. 
In setting the legal and regulatory environment for the medical profession, governments are 
inclined to adhere to utilitarian ethics where decisions are made on the basis of cost-benefit 
calculations. The precise method of determining costs and benefits can depend on a range of 
political and social factors, not just a dollar and cents calculation. The history of tragic 
events such as the more than 100 deaths associated with the 1937 elixir sulfanilamide 
incident that gave impetus to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (1938) and the 
infamous 1957-61 thalidomide tragedy suggests that crisis management is the primary 
motivation for substantive changes in the legal and regulatory framework. In contrast to the 
well established code of medical ethics, the legal environment is a myriad of legislation 
established at different times with potentially competing ethical standards. In turn, relevant 
legislation will vary from issue to issue. For example, in the area of direct-to-consumer 
marketing of genetic tests, regulatory oversight and associated legislation in the US would 
include: the Federal Trade Commission, the Centers for Disease Control, the Food and Drug 
Administration and the state health agencies (Berg and Fryer-Edwards 2008, p.27). Similarly, 
the “Common Rule” principles that inform the institutional process for ethical approval of 
medical research as reflected in Title 45 CFR apply to some seventeen federal agencies 
(White 2007). 
                                                                          
5 In the US, the ‘institutional review board’ (IRB) is also referred to with similar names such as the 
‘independent ethics committee’ or ‘ethical review board’. The purpose of the IRB is to approve, monitor, 
and review biomedical and behavioral research involving humans. The primary motivation of IRB 
activities is to protect the rights and welfare of the human subjects involved in the trial. The legal 
authority for the IRB can be found in the legislation empowering the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA) and Department of Health and Human Services (HHS),   It is the HHS regulations that 
specifically empower IRB’s to approve, require modifications in (to secure approval), or disapprove 
R&D clinical trials. IRB’s are governed by the Research Act of 1974, Title 45 CFR (Code of Federal 
Regulations) part 46. This legislation defines IRB’s and requires that IRB’s approve all research that 
receives funding, directly or indirectly, from HHS. Oversight of IRB’s resides with the Office for Human 
Research Protection (OHRP) within HHS. For present purposes, Title 21 CFR, part 56 is also important 
as this requires IRB’s to oversee clinical trials of drugs involved in new drug applications to the FDA. In 
Canada, the regulatory authority for ethical issues under the Food and Drug Act resides with the 
“Review Ethics Board” (REB) which is a similar counterpart to the US IRB. The REB’s represent the 
major health catchment regions across the country. Under the Act, REB approval is required to carry out 
clinical trials involving humans. The corporations seeking approval from an IRB, REB or other such 
entity in other jurisdictions are, in most cases, multinationals that are involved in acquiring government 
approval to market patent protected drugs in a number of legal jurisdictions. 
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4. Direct-to-consumer and direct-to-physician marketing 
Economic medicalization is evident in the direct-to-consumer television marketing 
campaigns by the pharmaceutical companies. Campaigns are designed to put in place a 
public perception of illness and health consistent with the portfolio of prescription drug 
products on offer, e.g., Moynihan and Cassels (2005); Brennan et al. (2010). Where bodies 
were once understood as normatively healthy and only sometimes ill, effective marketing 
has individuals seeing their bodies as inherently ill, and only able to be brought towards 
health with the effective medical treatment. The history of Viagra and the erectile 
dysfunction drugs attest to the ability of the direct-to-consumer marketing by 
pharmaceutical companies to transform a non-medical problem into a medical one. The 
treatment of risk factors for illness and not just the associated illness has also allowed 
pharmaceutical companies to dramatically increase the sales of prescription drugs. Other 
instances of the types of drugs that have exhibited substantial direct-to-consumer 
promotional spending are anti-psychotic agents, proton pump inhibitors, COX-2 inhibitors 
and HMG-CoA reductase inhibitors (Donohue et al. 2007, p.677). Given the difficulty of 
determining whether a good outcome has resulted from the perceived ‘risk’ being 
successfully treated, this is a potentially much more profitable area for pharmaceutical 
company marketing campaigns to pursue than the development of drugs that treat actual 
diseases. 
Economic medicalization involves a complicated web of interaction between physicians, 
responsible for prescribing drugs and delivering medical care, and the pharmaceutical and 
medical device companies that supply the products that are essential to the practice of 
modern medicine. Rules on direct-to-consumer marketing vary across jurisdictions and 
medical products. For example, regulatory oversight of the direct-to-consumer marketing of 
genetic testing kits in the US would involve the Federal Trade Commission, the Centers for 
Disease Control, the Food and Drug Administration and the state health agencies (Berg and 
Fryer-Edwards 2008, p.27). In the realm of direct-to-consumer marketing, only the US and 
New Zealand currently leave this marketing method largely unrestricted. Other countries, 
such as Canada, allow such marketing with relatively lenient restrictions and may reduce 
restrictions further in the future (Cassels 2006). In the US, direct-to-consumer marketing was 
permitted through a regulatory decision of the FDA in 1998. Pines (1999) provides an 
historical overview of direct-to-consumer advertising up to the administrative change in 
FDA rules.  
Examining the marketing methods that companies use to influence treatment selection 
assists in identifying sources of ethical conflict in the medical R&D process. Following 
Donohue et al. (2007, p.676), spending on advertising and promotion to medical 
professionals and consumers in 2005 was: $4.2 billion for direct-to-consumer advertising; 
$18.4 billion for free samples mostly given to physicians; $6.8 billion for detailing; and, $429 
million for journal advertising. One key marketing strategy revolves around influencing the 
opinion leaders.6 Applying this strategy to the case of medical drugs and devices, opinion 
leaders can be identified with groups such as specialists, research faculty, heavy prescribers 
in a drug/device category and product champions. Considerable effort is given to finding 
                                                                          
6 The following discussion relies on Poitras and Meredith (2009). 
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opinion leaders willing to speak favourably about a company’s product. In many cases, 
opinion leaders derive financial gain from interacting with medical product marketers at a 
number of levels. Marketers try to influence opinion leaders because these groups, in turn, 
affect the purchasing habits of other buyers who respect the opinion leaders’ knowledge 
base and authority in a particular area. Following Poitras and Meredith (2009), the lack of 
“ethical transparency” in the motivations of opinion leaders in this process raises a number 
of ethical issues. 
The points of interaction between opinion leaders in the medical profession and companies 
marketing medical goods and services are numerous. Opinion leaders are retained: to 
provide presentations regarding research results at various venues; deliver lectures at 
conferences financed in whole or in part by the corporations that retain the opinion leader; 
acting as paid consultants to those corporations; and, offering symposia for continuing 
medical education in their fields of expertise. Such interactions, which are also arguably the 
legitimate business of the participants, cause ethical concern when it is difficult to determine 
the degree of independence that the opinion leaders are able to exercise given the financial 
and personal relationships that have developed between themselves and the corporations 
with whom they interact. Concerns arise that these ‘relationship marketing’ strategies may 
positively influence physician perceptions of the corporation and the products on offer, e.g., 
in qualitative evaluations of drug efficacy. The extent of this marketing strategy is somewhat 
staggering. Excluding free drug samples, Campbell (2007) estimates that 78% of U.S. 
physicians have been financially involved with industry: 35% received reimbursements; 18% 
were paid for consultancy; 16% had funded speaking engagements; 9% served on advisory 
boards; and, 3% were involved in clinical trials recruitment. 
While it is tempting to conclude that opinion leaders are of sufficient ethical stature that 
actual and substantive knowledge of the subject will dictate an unbiased reading of the 
evidence, it is not always clear whether published research by a given opinion leader is free 
from the influence of economic medicalization. In particular, ‘ghost-writing’ is a 
marketing/research strategy where a drug company will carry out research and then 
forward the manuscript to an author in attempt to secure their endorsement. Obviously, 
only those research results favourable to the product are forwarded to the prospective 
author. By attaching a respected author’s name to the research results, the company hopes 
to achieve more rapid acceptance of the drug or device in the marketplace than if the 
product was only advertised (Healy 2004). This strategy is particularly attractive to 
academic research faculty where publications in prestigious journals have considerable 
value to career progress. In turn, ghost-written and other positive published research 
permits sales representatives of a drug or medical device company to bring these trial 
results to the prescribing physician in an effort to influence prescription pattern choices. 
While the enlistment of opinion leaders plays a fundamental role in corporate marketing 
strategies, it is has traditionally been the prescribing physician that drug companies need to 
influence the most. Though this approach has changed somewhat with the rise of direct-to-
consumer marketing, the bulk of advertising and promotion spending is still targeted 
directly at physicians. A key element in this strategy is the ‘detail man’. It is estimated that 
there is approximately one pharmaceutical company sales representative for every 10 
doctors in most developed countries. The history of the modern detail man can be traced 
back to the 1940-1960 era when the prescription drug industry was in a period of enormous 
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expansion (Greene 2004). To address the dramatic changes in the medical profession 
brought on by the advent of a host of new and important prescription drugs, detail men 
during the period were transformed “from specialized salesmen into quasi-professionals”. 
The pharmaceutical companies recognized the value to drug sales if detail men could be 
seen as assistants to doctors, conveying useful information about important drug 
developments rather than being a mere salesman for products. Greene (2004) argues that 
this change of image “required a careful negotiation around doctors’ spaces, both 
figuratively and literally.” 
The lack of ethical transparency in the activities of detail men is apparent (Poitras and 
Meredith 2009). Though detail men can not be seen as telling doctors what to prescribe, their 
role is ultimately to influence prescription behaviours. To do this, detail men want to be 
seen by physicians as allied professionals, consciously modelled as having the same ethical 
objectives as doctors. For example, Greene (2004) reports that manuals for detail men 
reproduce parts of the AMA’s code of ethics. To be effective, detail men need to have the 
ability to interact with doctors, and require training to develop this ability. Detailing has to 
at least appear to educate, rather than merely to sell. In this process, the research pipeline of 
positive results are an invaluable tool for the detail men. Marketing to doctors often takes 
the form of getting doctors up to speed on the latest research. The range of techniques that 
can accomplish this goal includes not only marketing by pharmaceutical representatives, but 
also advertisements in professional journals, funding continuing medical education 
conferences and so on. 
Given that drug detailing and sampling are based on the marketing tactics used to generate 
demand for any product, not just pharmaceuticals and medical devices, the suspicion of 
economic medicalization is difficult to displace. Drug and medical device sales 
representatives bring research literature and clinical trial results to the doctors in efforts to 
influence prescription pattern choices, while at the same time company funded research 
ensures that unsuccessful clinical trials not get published so physicians are exposed mainly 
to studies supportive of the drug or medical device (Turner 2008). Influential opinion 
leaders tend to be involved in the clinical trials that are positively predisposed toward the 
sponsoring company’s drug or medical device (Anderson 2006). This can have a positive 
affect on the perception of their peers toward the product (Steinman et al. 2006). Sales 
representatives attempt to influence physicians through ‘relationship marketing’ where 
personal interaction with physicians is used to influence decisions. One example of such 
relationship marketing occurs where company representatives pay ‘preceptor fees’ (in some 
cases up to $1000 per day) to accompany surgeons in operating rooms and clinics. While the 
stated objective is to learn how physicians actually used the drug or medical device, serious 
concerns for medical ethics are raised regarding the protection of patient confidentiality and 
the potential for private funds flowing to doctors influencing physician choices of medical 
products. 
A key element in marketing to physicians is the provision of free samples in order to impact 
on prescription patterns. Chew et al. (2000) conclude that the availability of drug samples 
led their primary physician respondents to prescribe drugs different from their preferred 
choice, especially if it avoided costs to the patient. Campbell (2007) in a national U.S. survey 
reported that 78% of 1,255 physician respondents had received free samples. Pharmaceutical 
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companies do not undertake that level of free sample distribution unless it has a track 
record of producing results. Marketing research has long established that providing free 
samples is one of the strongest cues in terms of producing product trial and adoption. 
Medical product representatives donate substantial quantities of free samples to hospitals 
and clinics, presumably with the objective of slowly infiltrating the facility and subtly 
influencing staff usage patterns of drugs, devices and medical supplies. With the goal of 
promoting product efficacy, drug representatives aim to interact directly with hospital staff 
instead of, say, working through hospital pharmacologists who possess far greater 
knowledge of drug efficacy and safety and are much better equipped to evaluate drug 
alternatives. 
5. Economic medicalization of research studies
7
 
The medical research literature abounds with examples of bias in empirical studies of 
pharmaceutical effectiveness such as: studies with fundamental design flaws where no 
control groups or placebo arms are involved; and, studies where poor comparators are used, 
e.g., the sponsored drug is compared to a placebo (no treatment) instead of the most 
effective comparator drug available (Bero and Rennie 1996). Additional bias can be 
introduced by the method of comparison used. For example, economic cost comparisons are 
sometimes avoided when the effectiveness of new experimental drugs is being assessed. 
Due to large accumulated R&D expenses, such long patent-life drugs can be substantially 
more expensive than comparable predecessor drugs. Effectiveness measurement could 
emphasize, say, patient mortality instead of the increase in mortality compared to cheaper 
generic drugs that have comparable effectiveness. Sample bias can also be compromised 
through the impact of study entry criteria, such as excluding pregnant women or restricting 
ethnic minorities into the sample population. 
Economic medicalization of research studies is a process where the traditional values 
associated with the scientific method are replaced by research ethics that reflect the values of 
the market place. While traditional scientific values demand the researcher be as objective as 
possible in order to reduce the possibility of bias in the interpretation of the observed data, 
the ethics of the marketplace are more concerned with abnormal gains (losses) associated 
with ‘positive’ (negative) research results. In statistical terms, economic medicalization 
occurs when there is a decided bias towards unjust acceptance and against unjust rejection. 
One documented instance where this occurs is ‘publication bias’: a tendency to publish only 
favourable clinical trial results of an experimental drug. Corporate sponsors have little 
interest in providing negative information regarding a product in which they may have 
already invested millions of dollars. Even journal editors may show a predilection for 
publishing successful, as opposed to failed, clinical trial results (Schafer 2004). 
Consequently, the medical community observes the positive research study results for the 
drug that accumulate in the published literature rather than the failed trials of the drug 
which languish in the ‘file drawer’. 
Another instance of economic medicalization is ‘muzzle clauses’ in the contracts of 
investigators involved in clinical trials. These clauses are intended to prevent researchers 
                                                                          
7 This section is derived from Meredith and Poitras (2009, sec.3) 
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from releasing any information about the clinical trial without the sponsor’s permission. 
This can be problematic if the physician discovers significant safety concerns related to the 
trial. If the researcher releases the negative information, the terms of the muzzle clause are 
breached and a variety of undesirable outcomes can result. Examples of possible outcomes 
include: threats of civil lawsuits; the sponsoring company withdrawing financial support for 
the researcher and, possibly reducing or eliminating philanthropic contributions to the host 
institution; and, the sponsoring company engaging outside experts to refute the researcher’s 
findings. However, if the researcher sits on the information the doctor-patient accord to act 
in the best interests of the research subjects recruited for the drug trial is breached. Many 
facets of muzzle clauses emerged in the the Nancy Olivieri versus Apotex case that received 
international coverage in medical and ethics journals and is used as a classic example of the 
failure to deal effectively with the problems posed by restricting negative results from drug 
trials (Schafer 2004; Somerville 2002; Thompson et al. 2001). 
The controversy involving Apotex Inc., Dr. Nancy Olivieri and the Hospital for Sick 
Children in Toronto (the Hospital) originated in clinical studies of the drug L1 (deferiprone) 
that generated disputes between Apotex and Dr. Olivieri, between Dr. Olivieri and other 
investigators and between Dr. Olivieri and the Hospital. L1 was first synthesized in 1987 
and a research study by Dr. Olivieri and Dr. Gideon Koren of L1 patients at the Hospital 
began in 1989, funded by the federal government’s Medical Research Council of Canada 
(MRC). When this funding ended in 1992, an alternative source of funding was received 
from Apotex. While the company was initially reluctant to get involved with the 
development of L1 because of its impaired patent status and because it produced serious 
side-effects in some patients, Apotex ultimately obtained a licence to develop L1 from the 
patent holder and a drug trial conducted by Olivieri and Koren was sponsored which 
involved patients with thalassemia major, a disorder that impacts hemoglobin production. 
Participants in the study were randomly assigned to receive either L1 or deferoxamine, the 
established treatment for iron toxicity. The randomized trial was constructed to compare the 
effects of the two drugs on body iron levels. The contract between the researchers and 
Apotex governing the drug trial contained a muzzle clause. 
Details of the subsequent L1 drug trial are well known, e.g., Thompson et al. (2001). There 
was tension between Dr. Olivieri and officials of Apotex almost from the beginning, at least 
partly due to differences in expectations between the investigators who viewed the trials as 
continuing research work done under the MRC grant and Apotex whose expectations were 
consistent with the usual procedures for the initiation and conduct of industry funded drug 
studies. While in April 1995, the investigators published a paper indicating a ‘favorable 
effect of deferiprone on iron balance', by the autumn of 1995, some negative data were 
emerging from the compassionate use trial. This data was seen by Dr. Olivieri as a ‘loss of 
response’ or ‘loss of efficacy’ in some patients receiving L1. Apotex objected to this 
characterization, interpreting the findings as being due to variability in response that is seen 
with most drugs. In March 1996, Dr. Olivieri reported her findings of loss of response to the 
REB for the Hospital and was instructed to modify the patient information and consent 
forms and to advise physicians treating patients with L1 at other centres of the findings. 
In early May 1996, Apotex indicated to the REB that investigators in other centres involved 
in the drug trial did not agree with Dr. Olivieri's interpretation and that Apotex had 
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convened an expert panel of international stature to review the data. On May 24, 1996, 
Apotex wrote to Olivieri and Koren informing them that Apotex was not renewing the trials 
contract which had expired some weeks earlier. In this communication, Apotex reminded 
the researchers of the contract's confidentiality provision that: “all information whether 
written or not, obtained or generated by the Investigators during the term of the LA-O1 
[randomized trial] Agreement and for a period of one year thereafter, shall be and remain 
secret and confidential and shall not be disclosed in any manner to any third party except 
with the prior written consent of Apotex. Please be aware that Apotex will take all possible 
steps to ensure that these obligations of confidentiality are met and will vigorously pursue 
all legal remedies in the event there is any breach of these obligations.”  On the same date, 
Dr. Olivieri was informed that an additional consulting contract with Apotex would not be 
renewed and the same warning was issued to her about breaches of its confidentiality 
provisions. 
Needless to say, Olivieri was not deterred by the muzzle clause. In July 1996, the expert 
panel appointed by Apotex produced a report that supported the Apotex interpretation of 
the variability in response to L1. Dr. Olivieri produced a commentary rebutting these 
findings and reaffirming the negative conclusions about the efficacy of L1. Starting in early 
December 1996, Dr. Olivieri  began to disseminate the negative L1 results at a variety of 
professional conferences including the American Society of Hematology. In the time leading 
up to these presentations, Apotex indicated repeatedly that the company did not concur in 
the findings that L1 caused liver fibrosis in some patients and would not consent to the 
submission of the abstracts for publication. Dr. Olivieri was again notified that she would be 
breaching the contract if she proceeded to do so. Apotex also questioned the data 
supporting the conclusion, and arranged to have an independent analysis done by a leading 
expert on liver pathology. This expert came to a different conclusion than Dr. Olivieri, 
finding that L1 did not exacerbate liver fibrosis. Much of the subsequent notoriety and 
public attention the case received was due to the desire of Olivieri to publicize the events. 
Muzzle clauses are a relatively obvious implication of economic medicalization. Other 
implications are less obvious. Consider the issue of drug trial sample design. While concerns 
of public safety argue for a time series analysis of experimental medical products, economic 
pressures to bring a drug to market as soon as possible result in cross-sectional static (as 
opposed to dynamic) analyses. This fosters large Phase 3 trials where sample sizes are 
substantial, but the elapsed time may be insufficient for dynamic or cumulative effects of the 
experimental product to emerge. Phase 4 or post-marketing approval trials can be longer 
term and much more effective at detecting time series based cumulative effects. Yet, there is 
no requirement that phase 4 post-marketing or tracking studies be conducted or reported. 
The tragic consequences of OcyContin, Neurontin, Paxil, Accutane, (Caplovitz, 2006) Baycol, 
Aprotinin and Vioxx (Avorn, 2006) speak clearly to the dangers of long-term cumulative 
effects that have emerged only after extended periods of time in the market place. 
Because present regulations do not require drug and device firms to carry out and publicly 
vet phase 4 research programs, the law and the ethical issues surrounding Phase 4 clinical 
research trials are ill defined. A company that is concerned about the longer term side effects 
of a drug might carry out a longitudinal tracking study as a means of exhibiting due 
diligence. If negative results are found, the company would arguably have an ethical 
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responsibility to make those side effects known and, if serious enough, voluntarily pull the 
drug from the market. However, there is evidence that in some serious cases voluntary 
withdrawal did not happen, a consequence of the desire to avoid the multi-million dollar 
investment losses for the pharmaceutical company stockholders that can occur when such 
negative news is released to the capital market (Caplovitz 2006, Avorn 2006). In economic 
terms, a decision not to withdraw a drug (e.g., Vioxx) has to be weighed off against the 
danger of civil litigation associated with the damage done by the drug's side effects. This 
ethical-is-legal conundrum may also lead to effective Phase 4 trials not being carried out 
since if no negative side effects are found then there is no obligation to report them publicly 
(Avorn 2006). 
6. Future trends in economic medicalization  
Recent evidence suggests that a form of economic medicalization is happening in Phase 4 
studies. In 2000, Phase 4 studies accounted for 3.1% of all clinical trials worldwide that were 
registered with the U.S. National Institutes of Health. In 2008, Phase 4 trials accounted for 
16.7% of all registered trials, though it is difficult to tell whether this increase was due to  the 
increased registration of Phase 4 trials or to an actual increase in the number of such studies. 
In this vein, evidence points to the increasing use of primary physicians to conduct Phase 4 
trials where remuneration is paid for participation. At this point, it is unclear whether these 
studies constitute ‘real research’ with properly structured Phase 4 research protocols that 
would meet IRB standards or are just disguised ‘drug seeding’ marketing strategies. 
Deshpande and El-Chibini (2005) certainly point to the latter hypothesis, providing advice 
to pharmaceutical companies on how Phase 4 studies can be used to attract physician 
participation in order to generate new drug sales. This approach appears to be supported by 
Andersen et al. (2006) where it is reported that when general practitioners were paid $800 
US per patient to recruit subjects for an asthma study, there was an increase in the long term 
use of the trial sponsor’s drug. 
One disturbing aspect of economic medicalization is the transformation of the process for 
doing clinical trials into exercises that are motivated more as marketing vehicles than 
needed R&D. One immediate advantage of such a marketing strategy is that physicians can 
legitimately receive fees for the recruitment and tracking of subjects admitted into the 
clinical trials. In some instances these fees are not inconsequential. For example, Sismondi 
(2004, p.149) describes a US research study by Biovail that paid a fee of $1000 for doctors, 
plus $150 for office management expenses, for patient data when at least 11 of their patients 
renewed a prescription to Cardizem,  a drug intended for long-term use. In this case, paying 
doctors to get patients started on a course of treatment could lead to substantial profits from 
these prescriptions. Doctors who signed up for the trial but did not keep 11 patients on the 
drug received US$250 for participation. According to ethicists who commented on the case, 
a US$1000 payment to doctors was unusually high for a post-marketing research trial. 
Another ethically disturbing aspect of the evolution of economic medicalization concerns 
off-label prescription drug usage. The prescription drug approval process is based on 
research and clinical trials where specific drugs and medical devices are approved by 
review boards for specific applications. However, once approved, companies have economic 
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incentives to promote use of the drug for other medical conditions without further research 
reviews by government. Delays in seeking approval for alternative uses are consistent with 
obtaining a maximum revenue stream for a given product, if only because alternative uses 
can be a basis for a further round of patent protection. For example, Pfizer admitted guilt in 
the case of gabapentin (Neurontin), a drug originally intended for the treatment of epilepsy. 
The company subsequently used opinion leaders to market the drug to physicians for a 
range of other indications. Steinman et al. (2006) estimate the company spent $40 million 
U.S. in advertising and promotion with 50-66% of that budget going to professional 
education between 1996 and 1998. Significantly increased market penetration was achieved 
by selling gabapentin off-label. In general, Radley et al. (2006) estimate that 21% of all drug 
use in the U.S. among office based physicians was for off-label indications and that 73% of 
off-label uses lacked strong scientific evidence. 
Discernible trends in the pattern of economic medicalization indicate a number of flash 
points that threaten to undermine the validity of the present medical R&D clinical trial 
approval process. Regarding Phase 4 or post-approval research studies, there is currently no 
requirement that results of such studies need to be released or even that such trials be 
conducted according to IRB approved protocols. In situations where negative or ineffective 
results are found, companies will be reluctant to release such results and, without IRB 
oversight, will not be required to do so. Two particularly egregious cases where this has 
occurred is Bayer admitting to a ‘mistake’ in suppressing a study that showed dangerous 
side-effects associated with the drug Baycol and Merck’s suppression of studies that showed 
Vioxx doubled the risk of myocardial infarction and stroke (Avorn 2006). These studies only 
came to light because the adverse negative reaction spread over a large population was 
sufficiently detectable by other means. At present, exact information on the number of 
unregistered Phase 4 trials is not available, nor is the amount of remuneration flowing to 
physicians who enroll patients in these ‘trials’. 
Unfortunately, aiming to increase the reach and depth of ethical oversight in order to 
prevent questionable research practices may, in the end, be self-defeating. Faced with rising 
costs associated with obtaining clinical trial approval in developing countries, 
pharmaceutical companies are moving certain types of medical R&D offshore to third world 
jurisdictions where the ethical requirements of the drug approval process are substantially 
less due to lower costs, lax regulations and uneducated research subjects that make for more 
freedom in research design and lower all-in costs of doing experimental trials (O’Neill 2008). 
Arguably questionable randomization procedures have been observed in some research 
protocols used in third world countries. The classic case involved the randomization of 
African subjects to a placebo arm of a HIV drug study where an existing ‘gold standard’ 
treatment was available for comparison. Consequently certain HIV pregnant women 
received no treatment at all under the placebo arm of the study when a life-saving drug 
could have been administered without adversely affecting the trial results. Cost 
effectiveness in medical R&D seems an appropriate iteration on the economic 
medicalization theme. 
A final point of ethical concern can be found in the now rapidly emerging development of 
private research data bases. Such data bases are being created when clinical trials request 
subjects give blood and tissue samples for ‘future research’. Modern technology permits 
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these samples to be analyzed to the molecular and genetic level and this information entered 
into the data base. Such requests for blood and tissue samples are now commonplace in the 
consent forms and clinical trial protocols submitted to IRB’s. The data bases are conducive to 
in-house analysis by pharmaceutical companies. At present, even though the data were 
obtained from an approved clinical trial, there is no process to ensure that negative findings 
associated with experimental drugs obtained through exploitation of the data base will be 
subjected to public scrutiny by the IRB (Avorn 2006). It is fascinating that, as with other 
areas of marketing research, large data bases appear to have become the currency of R&D in 
the new millennium. With the rapid development of such large scale data-bases in the last 
decade, Phase 4 studies can also be conducted in house using multivariate observational 
analysis, more-or-less ensuring the privacy of the Phase 4 statistical results and avoiding 
problems of public scrutiny. 
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